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ESSAY
NEC TECHNOLOGY LLC V HTC AMERICA,
INC.: JUDGE BRYSON'S SITTING-BY-
DESIGNATION GUIDE TO SECURING STAYS
IN LIGHT OF INTER PARTES REVIEWS
JONATHAN STROUD*
Federal Article III judges may stay civil litigation. Stays are most
appropriate where another court or authority may resolve a part of or the entire
dispute. Some statutes guide the courts on when to stay; some case law and
appellate precedent guide judges on when a stay is appropriate. But the
interlocutory nature of such decisions makes precedential decisions scarce. The
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an administrative body tasked with
patent post-grant review, efficiently reviews patentability of and can estopp
later validity arguments. Stays in light of these proceedings are particularly
favored. Although it will be some time before a body of appellate precedent
develops surrounding these stays, one senior appellate judge from the patent-
focused U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation,
has issued a district court decision in a contentious district, where he exhaustively
compiled district court stay cases and offered a guide for other judges faced with
determining whether to stay. This Essay analyzes that decision.
* Chief Patent Counsel, Unified Patents Inc. Mr. Stroud was previously with
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and Dunner LLP, litigating before the
courts and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and prior to that, he was a patent
examiner with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. He is an adjunct professor
(teaching post-grant patent practice), a frequent writer, lecturer, and teacher, and a
proud alumni of the American University Washington College of Law. He owes deep
and special thanks tojarrad Wood, whose dedication, hard work, and maturity have been
invaluable; and to Laura Whitworth, for her ability, foresight, and professionalism beyond
her years. They both have boundless potential, and will go far.
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By requiring courts to apply this limited and relatively consistent
body of caselaw when determining whether to grant a stay, [the
CBM-stay subsection of the AIA] should ensure predictability and
stability in stay decisions across different district courts,
and limit the incentive to forum shop.
- SenatorJon Kyl 1
In the Court's view, the most important factor bearing on whether
to grant a stay in this case is the prospect that the inter partes
review proceeding will result in simplification of the issues before
the Court.
- The Honorable William C. Bryson2
INTRODUCTION
Words have power-you can't just say things. You have a moral
and ethical duty to others to ensure your words are correct, diligently
researched, and supported. It is a good rule of thumb for business,
research, parenthood, or the law. Yet too often, lawyers lean more on
eloquence and style than on the strength of their evidence.
Nowhere has that seemed truer than in patent law recently,
particularly in the heated rhetorical debates ranging among
Congress, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the patent bar. Indeed,
patent law's tendency toward extreme abstraction (or, some might
say, obfuscation) in lieu of support appears to trouble even U.S.
Supreme Court Justices.'
Blame our natures; it's what lawyers do. Except now, in the age of
Big Data, it's easier than ever before for lawyers, judges, law students,
and clients to fact-check even the most eloquent or complex claims
quickly and accurately.
Better understanding makes for better results. And luckily, some
judges, using data or exhaustive research, have taken it upon
themselves to cut through claims being bandied about, offering
instead firm guidance based on hard evidence, support, and
precedent. Nowhere is the strength of such well-sourced guidance
1. 157 CONG. REc. 3433 (2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added).
2. NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 13-CV-1058, 2015 WL 1069111, at *8
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
3. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) ("I began to think it looks pretty obvious. What's
supposed to go on, I don't understand it.") (statement ofJustice Breyer).
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more evident than in the procedural and substantive brilliance of
Federal CircuitJudge William Bryson's memorandum opinion in NFC
Technology LLC v. HTC America, Inc.4
Sitting by designation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, home to forty-four percent of all patent litigation in
the United States in 2015,6 Judge Bryson has exhaustively researched,
collected, and explained the many district court stay decisions issued
in the first three years of the America Invents Act (AIA) reviews.
In Part I, this Essay discusses the legal background of sitting by
designation, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), and a
district court's stay authority. In Part II, this Essay discusses the NEC
Technology LLC decision and the lessons it teaches.
I. BACKGROUND
A. District Courts Have Inherent Discretion to Stay Patent Litigation in the
Interests offudicial Economy and justice
District courts have inherent Article III docket-control power.'
That "power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."'
District court judges balance the parties' competing interests,' both in
view of reexamination' and in view of newer PTAB proceedings.0
4. No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015).
5. See 2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIEDPATENTS, http://unifiedpatents.com/
2015-year-end-report (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
6. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (finding that this docket-
control power necessarily implies that district courts also have the ability to modify or
lift a stay if it is no longer deemed efficient or equitable); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The [d]istrict [c]ourt has broad discretion to stay
proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket." (citing Landis, 299
U.S. at 254)).
7. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254.
8. Id. at 254-55.
9. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Courts
have inherent power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, including the
authority to order a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination." (citation
omitted)). In 1981, Congress enacted laws allowing ex parte reexamination of issued
patents. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2201 (9th ed. 2014, rev.
2015) (noting that the statutory basis for reexamination of patents became available
in 1981, and that on November 29,1999, Public Law 106-113 was enacted, expanding
reexamination by providing an "inter partes" option). Public Law 106-113
authorized the extension of reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes
reexamination procedure in addition to the present ex parte reexamination. Act of
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Congress intended for the new post-grant procedures under the
ALA to increase patent quality and reduce the burden of patent
litigation on district courts by allowing the PTAB to first resolve
patentability." To ensure that validity disputes will go forward in
only one forum, if a petitioner files a declaratory judgment action of
invalidity (but not a counterclaim of invalidity) on or after filing the
PTAB petition, the statute provides that the district court action will
be automatically stayed unless: (1) the patent owner asks the court to
lift the stay, (2) the patent owner files a civil action or counterclaim
for infringement, or (3) the petitioner asks to dismiss the civil
action.12 The statute establishes the automatic stay where courts tend
to favor granting a stay already-namely, where the petition comes
very early relative to the civil action devoid of the appearance of
gamesmanship." But what happens when-as in most cases to date-
the district court action is filed first?
If a patent owner files a civil action before a would-be defendant
petitions for an inter partes review (IPR) or post grant review (PGR)
proceeding, what procedures are there to ensure that the PTAB
patentability determination proceeds first? For IPRs and PGRs
(except covered business method patents (CBMs)), the AIA provides
no guidance, likely in recognition of the fact that district courts
Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 311, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-567. Sections 311 to
318 of Title 35 of the United States Code are directed to the optional inter partes
reexamination procedures. See Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination:
An Alternative to Litigation, Not a Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 177, 181-88 (2009)
(chronicling the development of the original ex parte reexamination statute); see also
Mark Consilvio & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unraveling the USPTO's Tangled Web: An
Empirical Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent Proceedings, 21 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 33, 36-47 (2013) (same, updated for and including post-grant review, inter
partes review, and covered business methods review).
10. Post-grant review proceedings were signed into law in 2011 with the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (AIA), seeking to add quicker, more efficient methods to
resolve disputes as to the validity of patents. See generally Jarrad Wood & Jonathan R. K.
Stroud, Three Hundred Nos: An Empirical Analysis of the First 300+ Denials of Institution for
Inter Pares and Covered Business Method Patent Reviews Prior to In re Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC, 14J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 112, 116 (2015) (allowing the
public, via the AIA, to "challenge patents after the patents are issued ... on any validity
issue" to facilitate "speed, certainty, and efficiency." (footnotes omitted)).
11. SeeWood & Stroud, supra note 10, at 113, 116 (noting that Congress created
the post-grant procedure to increase speed, certainty, and efficiency within the
system, as well as improve the quality of issued patents).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012) (stating also that a counterclaim of invalidity
does not trigger the automatic stay).
13. §§ 315(a) (2), 325(a) (2).
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already had and have an inherent power to control their own
dockets, including the power to stay any proceeding for good cause, a
power they routinely exercise in favor of ex parte reexamination and
the now-moribund inter partes reexamination procedures. District
courts consider stays in light of Patent Office proceedings by asking:
(1) whether a stay will simplify issues at trial, (2) whether discovery
is complete and a trial date is set, and (3) whether a stay will unduly
prejudice the non-moving party." They then balance the factors
and rule on whether, given their findings, it is in the interests of
justice to stay the case.
For CBMs, section 18 of the AIA mandates a similar four-factor test,
adding an additional element to the traditional stay analysis":
[(1)] whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues
in question and streamline the trial;
[(2)] whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set;
[(3)] whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly prejudice
the nonmoving party or present a clear tactical advantage for the
moving party; and
14. See, e.g., Lennon Image Techs., LLC v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., Nos. 2:13-
cv-235-JRG, 2:1y-cv-00239-JRG, 2014 WL 4652117, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014)
(denying a stay based on all three factors); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote
Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that two out of
the three factors weighed against the defendant and enying Defendant's Motion to
Stay); Star Envirotech v. Redline Detection, LLC, No. SACV 12-01861 JGB (MLGx),
2013 WL 1716068, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013) (applying the reexamination inquiry
to considerations of stay pending inter partes review (IPR)); Semiconductor Energy
Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at
*1, *4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that the three factor test still applied
after the passage of the AIA); see also Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 10-389-LPS,
2012 WL 3061027, at *3-5 (D. Del. July 26, 2012) (denying the defendants' motion
after examining the three factors); Gryphon Networks Corp. v. Contact Ctr.
Compliance Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D. Mass. 2011) (remarking that "[c]ourts
have inherent power to manage their dockets" and that courts will review the three
reexamination factors when deciding whether to enter a stay); Soverain Software
LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (reasoning that
courts can best manage their dockets by weighing "competing interests" and
maintaining "an even balance" (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55
(1936))).
15. See Broad. Innovation, LLC v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-2223-ABJ-
BNB, 2006 WL 1897165, at *3-4 (D. Colo. July 11, 2006) (articulating the four
factors that would be codified in section 18 of the AIA); 157 CONG. REc. 3416 (2011)
(statement of Sen. Schumer) ("The amendment employs the Broadcast Innovation
test, rather than other multifactor tests ... because this test properly emphasizes a
fourth factor often ignored by the courts: 'whether a stay will reduce the burden of
litigation on the parties and on the court."').
1080 [Vol. 65:1075
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[(4)] whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden
of litigation on the parties and on the court.1 6
The first three factors courts must evaluate for CBM-related stays
are almost indistinguishable from those courts must evaluate for stays
related to IPR, PGR, and other types of proceedings." In the context
of a CBM proceeding, these provisions weigh heavily in favor of a
district court's issuing a stay. Indeed, "it is nearly impossible" for a
district court not to issue one."
Because of some of the more challenging elements of CBM
proceedings, Congress passed section 18 at least in part to help
streamline the process of CBM patent litigation and lessen its
associated costs." Section 18 does not require that presiding judges
issue stays, but it strongly encourages them to do so. 0
To ensure "consistent application of standards and precedents
across the country and to avoid one particular court with a favorable
bench becoming the preferred venue of business method patent
plaintiffs,"21 section 18 also allows for interlocutory appeals of stay
16 AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
17. See NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am. Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL
1069111, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (reasoning that courts should pay particular
attention to "whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation" because Congress
added this fourth factor).
18 157 CONG. REc. 2861 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
19. See id. (explaining that the fourth factor was included to address cost
concerns that arose because a patent could be subject to reexamination and litigation at
the same time); see also infra Part II (analyzing a motion to stay pending litigation).
20. See SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 11-1292, 2013 WL 2457284, at
*1 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) (noting that stays of litigation reduce the burden of
litigation, which is the purpose of the transitional CBM program); Market-Alerts Pty.
Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P., 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 n.14 (D. Del. 2013) (same); see
also Zillow, Inc. v. Trulia, Inc., No. C12-01549JLR, 2013 WL 5530573, at *3 n.1 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 7, 2013) (quoting Senator Schumer as stating that the fourth statutory
stay factor for Covered Business Methods (CBMs) provides a "heavy thumb" on the
scale in favor of a stay); Versata Software, Inc. v. Volusion, Inc., No. A-12-CA-893-SS,
2013 WL 6912688, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2013) (noting Congress intended that
"a stay [pending CBM review] should only be denied in extremely rare instances."
(citation omitted)); Progressive Cas. Ins. v. Safeco Ins. of Ill., Nos. 1:10CV01370,
1:11CV00082, 1:12CV01068, 1:12CV01070, 2013 WL 1662952, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
17, 2013) (quoting Senator Schumer's "heavy thumb" language).
21. 157 CONG. REC. 3417 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) ("It is expected
that the Federal Circuit will review the district court's decision regarding a stay de
novo, unless there are unique circumstances militating against a de novo review, such
as subsequent requests for an interlocutory appeal in the same case."). The
"favorable bench" referred to suggests the Eastern District of Texas.
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
decisions to the Federal Circuit.22  On appeal, the Federal Circuit
reviews the district court's ruling de novo."
To date, the Federal Circuit has issued only five opinions on
appeals from CBM decisions24 and only one opinion responding to a
writ of mandamus seeking review of a stay related to an IPR.2 ' The
court's disposition of these cases is indicative of its posture toward
district court stays in pending CBM reviews. These six decisions are
relevant, by extension, to stays of pending IPR reviews, which are not
subject to interlocutory appeal.26  In all but one instance, the final
determination resulted in a stay.
Because district courts have relied on and been influenced by these
Federal Circuit cases when considering stays pending IPR,2 whether
the moving party will be successful in obtaining a stay is largely
dependent upon four factors.
1. Factor 1: Simplification of the issues
The Federal Circuit, in a divided opinion, explained that this factor
is meant to simplify the issues before the district court by giving it the
benefit of the PTO's expertise regarding patentability."2 Having the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 621 F. App'x 995, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Intellectual Ventures II, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 781 F.3d 1372, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 771 F.3d 1368, 1369-70
(Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Benefit Funding Sys. LLC v.
Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs. Inc., 767 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2014); VirtualAgility
Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
25. Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 611 F. App'x 720, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
26. See id. at 721 (deciding that the court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the stay
granted by the lower court because no extenuating circumstances justified allowing
mandamus of the stay); see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485
U.S. 271, 277-78 (1988) (opining that a denial of a stay is not appealable because it is
subject to reconsideration and is not final).
27. Compare Ultratec, Inc., 611 F. App'x at 723 (dismissing a writ of mandamus of a
grant of motion to stay), and Intellectual Ventures II, LLC, 781 F.3d at 1373 (dismissing
an appeal of a denial of motion to stay), and Versata Software, Inc., 771 F.3d at 1381
(remanding with instructions to grant motion to stay), and Benefit Funding Sys. LLC,
767 F.3d at 1387 (affirming a grant of motion to stay), and VirtualAgility Inc., 759 F.3d
at 1320 (reversing a denial of motion to stay), with Smartflash LLC, 621 F. App'x at
1006 (as to one appellant, dismissing an appeal of a denial of motion to stay;
remanding and reversing the stay as to other appellant).
28. Jonathan Stroud et al., Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in
Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant
Review, 11 BuFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 239 (2015).
29. Smatflash LLC, 621 F. App'x at 1000.
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PTAB consider an asserted patent's merits simplifies the issues before
the district court. Thus, it is possible that this element will always
direct a court toward granting a stay.
After all, if the [PTAB] holds all of the claims unpatentable, the
district court may dismiss the suit. If the [PTAB] holds only
some of the claims are unpatentable, there will be fewer left for
the district court to consider. And even if the [PTAB] cancels
no claims, the court case will be simplified because estoppel will
limit the arguments available, and the PTAB will have construed
claims, which may encourage the parties to settle or at least aid
the district court's decision making.3 0
Although courts suggest that a "stay is particularly justified when the
outcome of a PTO proceeding is likely to assist the court in
determining patent validity or eliminate the need to try infringement
issues,"3 judges differ on their approach to this element.
These variations largely depend on two factors: (1) whether the
petition has merely been filed or whether the PTAB proceeding has
since been instituted, and (2) the degree to which patent claims
asserted in the underlying dispute overlap with those over which
litigants seek review. When the PTAB has instituted a review,
particularly when it has instituted a review of all the claims in the
litigation, the first factor militates heavily in favor of a stay.2 Here,
there is a "substantial likelihood of simplification of the district court
litigation," but "that likelihood is far more speculative before the
PTAB decides whether to institute review."" In VirtualAgility, Inc. v.
30. Stroud et al., supra note 28, at 240-41; see, e.g., Neste Oil OYJ v. Dynamic
Fuels, LLC, No. 12-1744-GMS, 2013 WL 3353984, at *4 (D. Del. July 2, 2013) (noting
that the inter partes review petition allows for greater issue simplification, "and the
fact that this case remains in its earliest stages only increases the prospect that a stay
pending review will advance the interests ofjudicial economy").
31. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Millennial Media, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-04206-
EJD, 2014 WL 2738501, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014); see Gould v. Control Laser
Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (remarking there is no per se rule that
patent cases must be stayed, but that it can be particularly justified in these cases);
3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. Stealth Monitoring, Inc., No. 6:14-CV-162-JDL, 2015 WL
179000, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015) (same); Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. TP-Link
Techs., Co., No. 6:13-cv-384-JDL, 2014 WL 5035718, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014)
(same); Air Vent, Inc. v. Owens Coming Corp., No. 02:10-cv-01699, 2012 WL
1607145, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2012) (same).
32. See, e.g., Unifi Sci. Batteries, LLC v. Sony Mobile Commc'ns AB, Nos.
6:12cv224JDL, No. 6:12cv223JDL, 6:12cv225 LED-JDL, 6:12cv221 LED-JDL, 2014 WL
4494479, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014) (denying the motion to stay where a large
number of the claims at issue were not in an inter partes review).
33. NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015); see id. at *7 (reporting that the "near-uniform line of
1083
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Salesforce.com, Inc.,` for example, the district court opined on the
patent's chance of surviving PTAB review. Finding that the prior
patent examination was "thorough," the district court judge
considered numerous prior art references and section 101 issues; the
judge noted the PTAB instituted review based on only one
reference." The judge noted that other, non-prior art references "of
particular importance" were involved in litigation, but were not
authority" holds "that after the PTAB has instituted review proceedings, the parallel
district court litigation ordinarily should be stayed"); id. at *6 (citing the following
IPR-related stays: Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C-14-3348 EMC,
2015 WL 1006582, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015); Gentherm Can., Ltd. v. IGB Auto.,
Ltd., No. 13-11536, 2015 WL 804657, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2015); Verinata
Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 435457, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015); Serv. Solutions U.S., LLC v. Autel.US Inc., No. 1:13-10534,
2015 WL 401009, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2015); In re CTP Innovations, LLC, No.
14-MD-2581, 2015 WL 317149, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 23, 2015); Safe Storage LLC v. Dell
Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01624-GMS, slip op. at 5 (D. Del. Jan. 22, 2015); Cutsforth, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Techs. Corp., No. 12-1200 (SRN/JSM), 2015 WL 9859635, at
*1 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2015); CANVS Corp. v. United States, No. 10-540 C, 2014 BL
378446, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 2014); Kaneka Corp. v. SKC Kolon PI, Inc., No. CV
11-3397JGB (RZx), 2014 BL 378445, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014); Locata LBS LLC
v. Paypal Inc., No. C 14-01864JSW, 2014 BL 378444, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014);
Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JDL, 2014 WL 6388489, at *1 (D.
Me. Nov. 14, 2014); Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 6:13-cv-
00278-JDL, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014); Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI
Tech., Inc., No. 13-cv-02013-JST, 2014 WL 5021100, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014);
Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02454-WSD, 2014
WL 5019911, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2014); Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint
Nextel Corp., Nos. C-13-04513, C-13-04201, C-13-04202, C-13-04203, C-13-04204, C-
13-04205, C-13-04206, C-13-04207, C-13-03586, 2014 WL 4802426, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2014); PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Google Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01317-EJD,
2014 WL 4100743, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v.
U.S. Bancorp, Civil No. 13-2071 (ADM/JSM), 2014 WL 5369386, at *1 (D. Minn.
Aug. 7, 2014); Affinity Labs of Texas LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV-2717
YGR, 2014 WL 3845684, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014); Depomed Inc. v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 13-571 (JAP), 2014 WL 3729349, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2014)). For
CBM-related stays, see Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134,
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing appeals from CBM-related stays); Moneycat Ltd. v.
Paypal Inc., No. 14-cv-02490-JST, 2014 WL 5689844, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014);
Secure Axcess, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 6:13-CV-717, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 20, 2014); DataTreasury Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-431-JRG-RSP, slip op. at
3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014); Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., No. 13-cv-2637
(SRN/SER), slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2014); Segin Sys., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar.
Co., No. 2:13cv190, 2014 WL 3895931, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2014); Benefit Funding Sys.
LLC v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs. Inc., 767 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
34. 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
35. Id. at 1310.
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before the PTAB. 6 The Federal Circuit rejected this approach,
finding that the court below had improperly adjudged the merits of
the grounds before the PTAB."
To be sure, some courts have granted stays where the PTAB has not
yet decided whether it will institute a proceeding." These decisions
have relied, in part, on the high frequency with which the PTAB
institutes petitions." To wit, some courts issue stays based on how
likely it believes the PTAB is to institute.40 The PTAB generally makes
its decision on institution within four to six months of filing." Thus,
if the PTO denies any petitions that provoked a stay, the stay will be
quickly lifted and would have been relatively short.
Because IPRs and CBMs are assessed patent-by-patent and claim-by-
claim, 2 myriad claims and multiple patents, defendants, or causes of
action complicate a district court's decision as to whether a PTAB
proceeding will simplify a case in practice; litigants accused of
infringement must sometimes file petitions for PTAB review on each
of the asserted patents and all of the asserted claims to move the
dispute to the PTO.43 But courts may still grant a stay where only a
subset of the asserted claims or patents are under review, if it
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1313.
38. See, e.g., Four Mile Bay LLC v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1300-JVB-
JEM, 2015 WL 4641609, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2015); iMTX Strategic LLC v.
Vimeo LLC, Nos. C15-00592 JSW, C15-00593 JSW, C15-00594 JSW, C15-00595 JSW,
C15-00596JSW, C15-00597JSW, C15-00598JSW, C15-00599JSW, 2015 WL 4089911,
at *1 (N.D. Cal.July 6, 2015); MLC Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No.
14-cv-03657-SI, 2015 WL 496407, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015).
39. See, e.g., Daniel F. Klodowski & David Seastrunk, Claim and Case Dispositio
FINNEGAN: AMERICA INvENTS Act BLOG, http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition
(last updated Mar. 1, 2016) (collecting statistics on the PTO's post-grant practices).
40. Id.
41. See Scott A. McKeown, How Long Before My PTAB Tial Is Instituted?, PATENTS
PosT-GRANT (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/how-long-before-my-
ptab-trial-is-instituted.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) ("Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a
person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute
an inter partes review of the patent"); see also Christopher Scharff, 5 Tips for Challenging a
Patent via anlPR, INSIDE COUNSEL (Dec. 21,2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/12/21/
5-tips-for-challenging-a-patent-via-an-ipr ("Filing multiple petitions may be necessary[:] A
single IPR petition may only challenge one patent. If multiple patents are at play, multiple
IPR petitions will be necessary.").
43. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,635 (Aug. 14, 2012) (providing, in a response to
comments made in regards to a proposed rule, that "the filing of multiple petitions
directed to subsets of related claims should be considered").
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determines that doing so would simplify the issues before it." For
instance, the court in Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Cardiocom,
LLC 5 followed this logic, holding that "it seem [ed] more likely than
not that at least some of the claims may be at least amended during
reexamination."" Thus, the court found that it would "greatly
benefit from the PTO's guidance." Similarly, in Versata Software, Inc.
v. Callidus Software, Inc.," the court reasoned that "[s]tays can be
warranted even when a CBM proceeding does not address all asserted
patents, claims, or invalidity defenses.""
These opinions notwithstanding, other courts have come to
contradictory conclusions regarding disputes where only a subset of
the claims and patents are under review.o In Unifi Scientific Batteries,
LLC v. Sony Mobile Communications AB,"' for instance, the court found
that these mixed claim sets-some on review and some not-weighed
against issuing a stay."
When there are multiple co-defendants in a case, courts often ask
co-defendants to agree to refrain from raising any invalidity
contentions based on prior art and arguments actually raised and
finally adjudicated in the PTAB proceedings, thus enlarging the
scope of potential estoppel in exchange for those co-defendants
reaping the benefits of a stay." These agreements expand the IPR
44. See Bonutti Skeletal Innovations, LLC v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., Nos. 12-cv-
1107 (GMS), 12-cv-1109 (GMS), 12-cv-1110 (GMS), 2014 WL 1369721, at *1 (D. Del.
Apr. 7, 2014) (granting stay where four of six patents were under IPR).
45. No. 5:12-CV-3864-EJD, 2012 WL 6020012 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).
46. Id. at *2; see Princeton Dig. Image Corp. v. Konami Dig. Entm't Inc., Nos. 12-
1461-LPS-CJB, 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 3819458, at *2, *6 (D. Del. Jan. 15, 2014)
(granting a stay even though one IPR had not yet been instituted); see also Princeton
Dig. Image Corp. v. Konami Dig. Entm't Inc., Nos. 12-1461-LPS-CJB, 13-335-LPS-CJB,
2015 WL 219019, at *1, *4 (D. Del. Jan. 15, 2015) (continuing a stay after institution
was denied for three dependent claims; thus, the validity of some claims would not
be resolved by the PTAB).
47. Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc., 2012 WL 6020012, at *2.
48. 771 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated as moot 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
49. Id. at 1371.
50. See, e.g., Card-Monroe Corp. v. Tuftco Corp., No. 1:14-cv-292, slip op. at 7
(E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015) ("[T]he benefit of such a review would be limited
because it would only have the potential to resolve issues with one of the three
patents at issue in the instant litigation.").
51. Nos. 6:12cv224JDL, 6:12cv223 LED-JDL, 6:12cv225 LED-JDL, 6:12cv221 LED-
JDL, 2014 WL 4494479 (E.D. Tex.Jan. 14, 2014).
52. Id. at *2-3 (denying review where a large number of the claims at issue were
not in IPR).
53. Stroud et al., supra note 28, at 244; see, e.g., iMTX Strategic LLC v. Vimeo
LLC, Nos. C15-00592 JSW, C15-00593 JSW, C15-00594 JSW, C15-00595 JSW, C15-
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and CBM's estoppel provisions to cover all co-defendants, regardless
of whether they are parties to the PTAB proceedings.5 4 When less
than all co-defendants agree, it can weigh against a stay." Similarly,
offering procedural stipulations can lessen the suggestion of
prejudice to the patent owner. For instance, moving parties can
consider stipulating to a faster trial schedule; or, should the claims
survive, they may agree to jointly dissolve a stay after an IPR, PGR, or
CBM; they could also agree to modified meet-and-confer or notice
00596JSW, C15-00597JSW, C15-00598JSW, C15-00599JSW, 2015 WL 4089911, at *3
(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2015) (granting a stay conditioned on defendants' agreement "to
be estopped from asserting any invalidity contention that was actually raised and
finally adjudicated in the CBM proceedings"); Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., No. C-14-3348 EMC, 2015 WL 1006582, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (finding
co-defendants' agreement o be bound by the IPR estoppel provisions alleviated the
court's concerns and weighed in favor of a stay); Pi-Net Int'l, Inc. v. Focus Bus. Bank,
Nos. C-12-4958-PSG, C-12-4959-PSG, C-12-4962-PSG, 2013 WL 4475940, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2013) (granting a stay conditioned on defendants' refraining from
raising any invalidity defense that they could have raised in the IPR); Achates
Reference Publ'g., Inc. v. Symantec Corp., No. 2:11-cv-294-JRG-RSP, slip op. at 2
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2013) (same); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux
Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012)
(granting a stay because "[d]efendants who did not file the IPR petitions have agreed
to be bound by the estoppel provisions of the IPR proceedings").
In Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the court stated:
[B]ecause [defendant] is not one of the IPR petitioners, [it] would not be
precluded under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2) from reasserting invalidity
contentions rejected by the PTO.... If [defendant] and IPR petitioners
communicate on strategy, [defendant] should be bound by the full statutory
estoppel provision. If, however, [defendant] has no input on the IPR
strategy, it should not be precluded from raising arguments that could have
been raised in the IPR proceedings.
Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. C-13-4513-RMW, 2014 WL
819277, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014); see also In re Protegrity Corp., No. 2600, 2015
WL 4734938, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) (weighing the first, third, and fourth factors
of the section 18 test, and finding that conditioning a stay on defendant's agreement o
be estopped by the results of PTAB proceedings was not warranted in this case).
54. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 2012 WL 7170593, at *2 (remarking that
even defendants not involved with the IPR proceedings have agreed to be bound by it).
55. See id. ("The estoppel effect of inter partes review carries less weight when
there are several defendants that are not parties to, and thus are not bound by, the
estoppel effects of the proceeding."); see also e-Watch Inc. v. Avigilon Corp., No. H-
13-0347, 2013 WL 6633936, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013) (granting a stay
pending related adversarial IPR proceedings with Mobitix, but awaiting
determination as to whether Avigilon should be estopped under section 315 of the
AIA from asserting any section 102 or 103 arguments that reasonably could have
been raised by Mobitix, or only estopped on the grounds actually raised in the
related IPR by Mobitix).
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requirements. When third parties unrelated to the litigation bring
IPRs, a court may still stay the litigation, even without the parties agreeing
to be bound by the same estoppel," or alternatively, by agreeing to be
bound by the limited estoppel of what was actually raised and adjudicated
before the PTAB in the unrelated proceeding.58
Under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) and through sections 102 and 103 of the
Patent Act, the scope of IPR proceedings is narrowed to include only
anticipation or obviousness over prior art patents or printed
publications.5 ' This leaves litigation over other invalidity issues-such
as patentable subject matter, usefulness, enablement, written
description, and statutory bars-for the court.' Particularly when
the moving parties have already raised additional issues through
counterclaims, some courts refuse to grant stays in cases involving
56. See Blue Calypso, Inc. v. Groupon, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-00486-MHS, slip op. at 1-
2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2014) (granting a stay in a trial with many defendants, given
nine listed stipulations that all parties agreed to).
57. In Grecia v. American Express Co., No. 1:15-cv-09217-RJS (S.D.N.Y. May 6,
2016), Grecia v. MasterCard Inc., No. 1:15-cv-09059-RJS (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2016), and
Grecia v. Visa Inc., 1-15-cv-09210-RJS (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2016), a New York court
granted American Express Company, MasterCard Incorporated, and Visa
Incorporated a stay of their district court litigation in light of three IPRs filed by
Unified Patents Incorporated on three patents asserted by Mr. Grecia, Patents Nos.
8,402,555, 8,533,860, and 8,887,308, prior to the institution of those IPRs. The
details of that stay, granted during a hearing, are unclear.
58. In Grecia v. DISH Network, LLC, No. 4-16-cv-00588 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016), a
California court granted DISH Network, LLC ("DISH") a stay of their district court
litigation in light of an IPR filed by Unified Patents Inc. on the sole asserted patent,
U.S. Patent No. 8,887,308, prior to the institution of that IPR. DISH requested no
estoppel apply. The plaintiff requested that DISH be bound by the full estoppel of
the statute as well as a broader estoppel urged by Mr. Grecia. Thejudge ruled in the
alternative, asking DISH to be bound by a limited form of estoppel-i.e., only the
issues actually raised and finally adjudicated in the IPR.
59. There is healthy debate at bar about which forum is most appropriate for this
type of determination, and whether invalidity should be determined under different
claim construction standards, evidentiary standards, and procedural requirements.
See, e.g., Laura C. Whitworth, What's in a Claim?: The Importance of Uniformity in Patent
Claim Construction Standards Between District Court Litigation and Inter Partes Review, 98 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 21, 33, 37-39 (2016) (describing the early success of
IPRs and arguing that the PTAB and the district courts should use the same claim
construction standards when analyzing claims for the purposes of invalidity). The
issue was recently taken up on certiorari by the Supreme Court, though as of this
Essay's publication date, the result was not certain. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
60. See Whitworth, supra note 59, at 38-39.
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other causes of action or invalidity theories." In light of these
rulings, other courts might similarly refuse to grant stays in cases
where accusations of infringement only represent a portion of the
case. Particularly, "I[i]ssues of trade secret misappropriation, unfair
competition, or trademark infringement ... may expand a case
beyond patentability."6" This is particularly relevant, given President
Barack Obama's recent signing of the Defend Trade Secrets Act,
which allows companion federal trade secret rights of action."
2. Factor 2: State of district court proceedings
When balancing the second element, courts consider whether the
parties have completed discovery and whether the case has been set
for trial. Under this factor, courts determine whether it would be
more or less expeditious to allow the PTAB to determine patentability
while considering the resources already expended in the case.
Courts look to two factors, among others, to make this
determination: (1) the speed with which the particular district court
the case is before normally disposes of patent litigation,' and (2) the
stage of litigation the case is in when the moving party files its
petition at the PTO.6'
The first factor-what court the case is currently before-is highly
relevant to the court's determination, as the time it takes to resolve
patent cases differs greatly across districts. Some courts accelerate
61. E.g., Report and Recommendation at 5, U.S. Nutraceuticals LLC v.
Cyanotech Corp., No. 5:12-cv-366-Oc-1OPRL (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2013) ("The inter
partes review proceeding will have no bearing on Defendants' counterclaims, such as
for unfair competition.").
62. Stroud et al., supra note 28, at 245.
63. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 90).
64. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures II, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 781 F.3d
1372, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (observing that the district court based its denial of a
motion to stay, in part, on the fact that it anticipated "the litigation to be resolved in
less than a year," compared to a CBM review process that could take more than
eighteen months).
65. See, e.g., Destination Maternity Corp. v. Target Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 762,
767-68 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (less than four months after infringement contentions was
reasonably timely); Software Rights Archive, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. C-12-3970
RMW, 2013 WL 5225522, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013) (just over four months after
identification of asserted claims was reasonable); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.
Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (a "mere" three to four month delay in filing petition after
infringement contentions was reasonable).
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patent cases, pushing them to trial in a matter of two years or less."
Other, less ambitious courts allow cases to develop in earnest, often
over several years.'7  In jurisdictions like the Eastern District of
Virginia, which is known as the "rocket docket,"' stays pending PTAB
proceedings may be less likely because cases there proceed to trial
more quickly than those on other dockets."
The timing of a stay motion also impacts a court's decision to stay.
Accordingly, late stay motions, such as those where litigants have
already had the benefit of a trial, in whole or in part, are less likely to
merit a stay in favor of PTAB proceedings.70 In fact, in Smartflash LLC
v. Apple, Inc.," the Federal Circuit overturned the lower court's denial
of a stay sought before trial as to one defendant, but upheld the
66. See, e.g., U.S. DIsT. CT. E.D. TEX. PATENT R. 1-2 (permitting a judge to
"accelerate" patent cases based on factors such as the "complexity of the case or the
number of patents, claims, products, or parties involved").
67. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 1083, 1090, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2008) (ruling patent valid and infringed three
years after the complaint was filed).
68. Dabney J. Carr IV & Robert A. Angle, Litigating Patent Infingement Cases in the
"Rocket Docket" of the Eastern District of Virginia, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TEcH. L.J. 14, 14 (2010).
69. SynQor, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2:14-cv-00286-RWS-CMC, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 10, 2015) (denying a motion to stay when fact and expert discovery had
closed and the case was headed for trial in three months).
70. Per statute, CBMs may be filed at any time, but an IPR can be filed only
within one year of the service of a district court complaint. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
(2012). As such, a trial occurring before a stay is requested-as in Smartflash-is
much more likely in relation to a CBM than an IPR. The Smartflash majority
confirmed district court findings that, in seeking a stay after trial, the moving party
demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing, as well as an attempt to gain tactical
advantage over the patent owner. Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 621 F. App'x 995,
1002 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Similarly, if the parties have undergone the Markman
hearing-a procedure that arose from the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996), which requires judges (as
opposed to juries) to determine the construction of a patent-and have completed
discovery, the balance shifts against granting a stay. E.g., Bonutti Research, Inc. v.
Lantz Med., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00609-SEB-MJD, 2015 WL 3386601, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May
26, 2015) (denying a motion to stay where parties had submitted Markman briefs, a
Markman hearing was set, and depositions had begun); Unwired Planet, LLC v.
Square, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00579-RCJ-WGC, 2014 WL 4966033, at *3, *9 (D. Nev. Oct.
3, 2014) (denying a motion to stay where the majority of discovery was complete and
a Markman order was imminent); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control,
Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (denying the defendant's
motion to stay pending IPR where the plaintiff had already served written discovery,
a trial date was set, and the court had held a Markman hearing and issued a claim
construction ruling). Where the parties have little left to do before trial, a court is
less likely to grant a stay. See cases cited supra.
71. 621 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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court's denial of a stay the moving party requested after trial as to
another, thus succinctly illustrating in one case the impact timing
can have on the issuance of a stay. Similarly, in NFC Technology LLC v.
HTC America, Inc.," the court found that an IPR petition filed just
over seven months after the plaintiffs filed their complaint and only
four months after the plaintiffs served their infringement contentions
was reasonable." Therefore, although each district disposes of
litigation at different rates, courts are more likely to grant a stay when
a petition is filed prior to major case developments.
The sooner litigants request PTAB review, the more likely the
Board is to institute, which in turn makes a court more likely to grant
a stay. Take for instance Automatic Manufacturing Systems, Inc. v.
Primera Technology, Inc." There, although the court initially denied
the party's motion to stay," it ultimately granted a renewed motion,
noting that the matter was "now ripe for ... adjudication."n In the
earlier denial, the court stressed that the time between filing the
petition and institution meant that the case would "have been left
languishing on the [c]ourt's docket with no discovery, no positioning of
the parties on claim construction, and no dispositive motions" had the
PTAB not instituted a review. Thus, to prevent a case from
"languishing," a party seeking PTAB review should file its petition shortly
after a case is filed to increase their chances of being granted a stay.
Similarly, in VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.," the district
court found that the party's filing of its motion at a "relatively early
stage of the proceedings" significantly factored into its decision to
issue a stay." The claim constructions before the court and that the
parties had completed some discovery (though six months of fact
discovery remained) both pointed in favor of granting a stay." On
72. Id. at 1006. But see Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-
bbc, 2015 WL 2248437, at *6 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015) (granting a stay in view of IPR
after receipt of the jury verdict, but before ruling on post-trial motions).
73. No. 2:13-cv-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015).
74. Id. at *3.
75. No. 6:12-cv-1727-Orl-37DAB, 2013 WL 1969247, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 13,
2013).
76. Id. The court granted the party leave to re-file, pending the outcome of the
PTAB's decision on institution. Id.
77. Automatic Mfg. Sys., Inc. v. Primera Tech., Inc., No. 6:12-cv-1727-Orl-37DAB,
2013 WL 6133763, at *1, *34 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2013).
78. Automatic Mfg. Sys., Inc., 2013 WL 1969247, at *3.
79. 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
80. See id. at 1315-16.
81. See id. at 1315.
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appeal, the Federal Circuit largely concurred with the lower court's
decision, finding that "it was not error for the district court to wait
until the PTAB made its decision to institute CBM review before it
ruled on the motion. "82 Overall, for litigants to increase their
chances of being granted a stay, they should file their motions as
soon as possible after litigation begins.
3. Factor 3: Undue prejudice
Under the third factor, courts determine the extent to which
granting a stay will prejudice the non-moving party. Although some
have argued that this prong will always militate toward denying the
motion because it will invariably disadvantage the patent owner,"
"the omnipresent potential for delay does not alone suffice to
establish the prejudice needed to deny a stay."" Indeed, the PTAB is
required to complete IPRs and CBMs within twelve months of
instituting review." Thus, the statutorily mandated timeline mitigates
the risks present before the passage of the AIA that would have
weighed against a stay, including risks that evidence will be lost or
that circumstances will be changed due to unexpected events.
However, "waiting for the administrative process to run its course"
frequently "risks prolonging the final resolution of the dispute and
thus may result in some inherent prejudice to the plaintiff.""
Although this possible interruption, standing alone, does not tip the
scales against issuing a stay, it is nevertheless a factor courts must
consider." That said, because "granting inter partes review probably
82. See id. (noting that "the timing factor heavily favors a stay").
83. See Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P., 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 494
(D. Del. 2013) (obsercing that though a stay creates some prejudice, it does not
necessarily create undue prejudice).
84. Stroud et al., supra note 28, at 248; see Conair Corp. v. Tre Milano, LLC, No.
3:14-cv-1554(AWT), 2015 WL 4041724, at *4 (D. Conn.July 1, 2015) ("Delay by itself
does not necessarily constitute undue prejudice, as nearly every judicial stay involves
delay." (citing Smart Modular Techs., Inc. v. Netlist, Inc., No. 2:12-c-02319-TLN-
EFB, 2013 WL 2384342, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 30, 2013))); Capriola Corp. v. LaRose
Indus. LLC, No. 8:12-cv-2346-T-23TBM, 2013 WL 1868344, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
11, 2013) (staying litigation notwithstanding the fact that the parties directly
competed in the relevant market); Neste Oil Oyj v. Dynamic Fuels, LLC, No. 12-662-
GMS, 2013 WL 424754, at *2-3 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2013) (finding that "the potential
for delay does not, by itself, establish undue prejudice" and that concerns about
direct competition between the parties were not persuasive in that case).
85. Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd., 922 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
86. Id. at 494.
87. Capriola Corp., 2013 WL 1868344, at *2-3 (staying litigation notwithstanding
that the parties directly competed in the relevant market); Neste Oil Oyj, 2013 WL
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results in an even higher likelihood than under the prior standard
that the issues in [an] action will be simplified by the
reexamination,"" difficult cases in which a court would likely deny
the motion in view of review could possibly now favor the movant.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, courts also look to
several other elements when considering the "undue prejudice" or
"clear tactical advantage" prong of the AIA analysis." One of these
factors is whether the litigants compete in the market." If a stay
424754, at *2-3 (finding that "the potential for delay does not, by itself, establish
undue prejudice" and that concerns about direct competitiveness were not
persuasive in that case).
88. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-
JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (citing Inogen, Inc. v.
Inova Labs, Inc., No. SACV 11-1692-JST (ANx), 2012 WL 4748803, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2012)).
89. See E-Watch, Inc. v. Lorex Can., Inc., No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL 5425298, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013) (remarking that "mere lapse of time" was not sufficient
prejudice); Voltstar Techs., Inc. v. Superior Commc'ns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00082-JRG,
2013 WL 4511290, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013) (noting direct competition of the
parties as a consideration); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 2012 WL 7170593, at *3
(explaining that the plaintiff also claimed prejudice based on "reputational and
financial damage" and "allegations of inequitable conduct"); TierraVision, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., No. 11cv2170 DMS(BGS), 2012 WL 559993, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
2012) (stressing that "delay alone is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice").
90. See Four Mile Bay LLC v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1300-JVB-JEM,
2015 WL 4641609, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2015) (noting that the parties were not
direct competitors when concluding that no undue prejudice existed); Allure Energy
Inc. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 1-15-CV-079 RP, 2015 WL 4207243, at *2-3 (W.D.
Tex. July 2, 2015) (denying a stay where "the parties [were] direct competitors in [a]
narrow, still-emerging market" and where the patent holder, a small start-up
company, contended that it could go out of business if a stay was instituted); Davol v.
Atrium Med. Corp., No. 12-958-GMS, 2013 WL 3013343, at *6 (D. Del. June 17,
2013) (denying a stay and finding that "Davol will suffer undue prejudice should it
be forced to continue competing with Atrium's accused products without being
permitted to advance its infringement claims"); Avago Techs. Fiber IP (Singapore)
PTE, Ltd. v. IPtronics Inc., No. 10-CV-02863-EJD, 2011 WL 3267768, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
July 28, 2011) ("Staying a case while [harm in the marketplace] is ongoing usually
prejudices the patentee that seeks timely enforcement of its right to exclude.");
Heraeus Electro-Nite Co. v. Vesuvius USA Corp., No. 09-2417, 2010 WL 181375, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2010) (" [C]ourts have been reluctant to grant stays where, as here,
the parties are direct competitors."). Courts have even considered lost market share
and revenue an "irreparable injury" that weighs heavily against a stay that would
delay the outcome of infringement proceedings. VirtualAgility, Inc. v.
Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00011-JRG, 2014 WL 94371, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex. Jan.
9, 2014), rev'd, 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Given that the patentee 'could lose
market share-potentially permanently-during the stay, . .. while the alleged
infringer continues to sell the competing products,' such loss constitutes an
irreparable injury not compensable by money damages.").
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would potentially allow the alleged infringer to acquire market share
from the patent holder, a court will be less likely to issue a stay
pending the resolution of a PTAB proceeding. If the parties sell
competing products and a stay could force the patent owner to lose
market share to the accused infringer, courts may be less willing to
make the patent owner wait for the PTAB proceeding to
conclude.91 On the other hand, if the patent owner does not
practice the patent in question, is not in competition for market
share with the alleged infringer, or if the patent has expired, a
court is more likely to issue a stay.92
For example, in VirtualAgility, the court found that because there
was "credible evidence" the parties competed for market share and
that, because of that competition, the patentee, which was a "small
company with limited resources," would be exposed to the possibility
of losing both its position in the market and goodwill if the litigation
were stayed,93 Judge Rodney Gilstrap found that the third factor
weighed "heavily against" granting a stay.94 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed the lower court,95 concluding that there was no
direct evidence that the parties competed in the market and,
although VirtualAgility could be harmed by a delay in litigation,
that harm would not be irreparable." Thus, although
"competition between parties can weigh in favor of finding undue
prejudice," it is not dispositive.9"
Finally, when a patent has already expired, a stay might not
prejudice a patent-holder at all." Accordingly, delays in litigation
could not adversely affect the party's patent because its term will have
91. SeeVirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
92. See id. at 1318 (explaining that a stay will merely delay realization of damages
that a successful plaintiff might be in an infringement suit, but not reduce the
possible award).
93. Id. at 1317.
94. See id. at 1317-18 (citing lost market share and loss of consumer goodwill that
would result if the patentee could not enforce its rights).
95. See id. at 1318 (finding that the concern of prejudice only "slightly" weighed
against granting the stay).
96. Id.
97. Id. The panel further considered the fact that VirtualAgility did not move to
preliminarily enjoin Salesforce.com, a fact that cut against VirtalAgility's argument
that it would be prejudiced without swift injunctive relief. See id. at 1318-19
(acknowledging that there could be other reasons why defendant did not move for a
preliminary injunction).
98. See, e.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp.
2d 1028, 1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
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already run." Because a court will fix damages on the litigation's
filing date and the patent's expiration date, prejudice is
minimized.o Thus, in this situation, litigation delays likely do not
weigh heavily in the court's consideration.
4. Factor 4: Reduction of litigation burden on the parties and the court
In addition to the first three factors, section 18 of the AIA compels
courts to consider whether the stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the
burden of litigation on the parties and the court. According to U.S.
Senator Charles "Chuck" Schumer, this "places a very heavy thumb on
the scale in favor of a stay."10' This assertion is borne out in reality.
In VirtualAgility, Judge Gilstrap found that the fourth element
might be only "slightly in favor" of a stay.' 2 He explained that the
PTAB would not likely overturn many asserted claims'o because
"general relief from dual track litigation. . . is inherent to all CBM
reviews""0 ' and many prior art claims were before the court that were
not before the PTAB.
Hearing the case on appeal, and ultimately overturning the lower
court's ruling, the Federal Circuit cautioned against conflating the
fourth factor with the first three.o' Illustrating the way in which
lower courts should evaluate this final factor, the Federal Circuit
explained that the fourth factor should include considerations of
"the number of plaintiffs and defendants, the parties' and witnesses'
places of residence, issues of convenience, the court's docket, and in
particular, its potential familiarity with the patents at issue."' For
many of these considerations, the court's evaluation will come down
to cost. Generally, looking at the average cost of a post-grant
proceeding compared to the average cost of litigation, it is most cost
effective to avoid litigation where possible.'
99. See id. at 1032 (noting that the patents cannot be amended).
100. Id. at 1034 (reasoning that "for the two asserted patents that have already
expired, there can be no further lost-customer type harm").
101. 157 CONG. REc. 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
102. VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, No. 2:13-cv-00011-JRG, 2014 WL 94371,
at *7 (E.D. Tex.Jan. 9, 2014), rev'd, 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *8.
105. See VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, 759 F.3d 1307, 1320 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
106. Id. at 1314 n.4.
107. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, 2015 REPORT OF THE EcoNoMIC SURVEY 32
(2015) (finding that median costs of post-grant work were $275,000 through the
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B. Patent Office Proceedings Often Lead to a Stay of District Court
Litigation
Congress meant the AIA's new statutory post-grant review
procedures to be, among other things, "quick and cost effective
alternatives to litigation."'" The AIA introduced new patent review
trials to be held before the rechristened PTAB, like IPR and PGR,
both of which went into effect on September 16, 2012.'" Section 18
of the AIA, titled "Transitional Program for Covered Business
Method (CBM) Patents," established a powerful subset of PGR
proceedings for certain patents."o CBM proceedings are, for the
purposes of this background, treated similarly to PGR proceedings."'
Procedurally, IPR, PGR, and CBM replace the paper
administration of inter partes reexamination with a trial conducted
by a panel of three administrative patent judges-complete with
limited discovery, deposition, and an oral argument."2 They shift the
burden from the PTO to the petitioner to show unpatentability."1
1. IPR
IPR trials-like district court trials-seek "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.""' The PTAB must issue
a final determination no more than a year post-institution,
extendable by six months for good cause, or indefinitely in the case
PTAB hearing and $350,000 through appeal on average compared to millions in
litigation costs).
108. H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (remarking that Congress wanted to
keep resources in researching and developing patents, not in fighting cases in court); see
157 CONG. REc. 2710 (2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (inter partes review was intended
to provide a "faster, less costly alternative [] to civil litigation to challenge patents").
109. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 313 (2011).
110. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-30. Because section 18 is scheduled to sunset after
eight years, it is not codified in title 35, but is rather a floating statute.
111. Section 18(a)(1) specifies that CBMs "shall be regarded as, and shall employ
the standards and procedures of, a post-grant review under chapter 32 of [T]itle 35,"
with some exceptions. § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 329.
112. See 157 CONG. REc. 3428 (2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
113. See id. ("One important structural change made by the present bill is that
inter partes reexamination is converted into an adjudicative proceeding in which the
petitioner, rather than the Office, bears the burden of showing unpatentability.").
114. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2015) (requiring PTAB procedural rules to be
"construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
proceeding"), with FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules "should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
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of joinder."' To institute an IPR, parties file a petition; the patent
owner may optionally respond to why the petition should not be
instituted; then the Board determines if the petition demonstrates
"there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable.""6
2. PGR and CBM
PGRs and CBMs are similar to IPRs. Unlike IPRs, parties may only
petition for PGR during the first nine months after the patent issues
(or reissues).m' With the exception of business method patents and
pending interferences, PGR only applies to patents with a priority
date later than March 15, 2013; specifically, the PGR applies only to
patents that contain a claim with an effective filing date that is on or
after March 16, 2013."
Section 18 of the AIA created a special type of post-grant review for
challenging CBM patents. Congress intended CBMs to be an
accessible, low-cost procedure for companies to challenge broad
patents of questionable patentability related to the financial
industry."9 CBMs reviews may be filed any time after issuance (other
than when a PGR is available), provided they meet other factors.120
Any party threatened or sued on a covered patent may pursue a CBM
petition.'2' They may raise any statutory grounds for invalidity,
including section 101, 102, 103, and 112 challenges.122
If the Board rules in a final written decision, the AIA estops the
petitioner from raising many patentability arguments before the
Board, in federal courts, or the International Trade Commission
(ITC). The scope of estoppel varies by the type of proceeding, but
all types attach when the PTAB issues the final written decision, prior
to a final appeal.124
115. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c).
116. Id. § 42.108(c).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.202.
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.201.
119. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:
Part H of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 630 (2012) (quoting supporters of section 18, who
viewed it as an "inexpensive and faster alternative to litigation" and "a crackdown on
low-quality business method patents").
120. 37 C.F.R. § 42.303.
121. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011); 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.302(a).
122. Matal, supra note 119, at 626; see AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. at 330.
123. Matal, supra note 119, at 626.
124. Id. at 616.
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For IPRs, the estoppel provision (section 315(e)) applies both an
inter-office estoppel (section 315(e) (1)) and a broader estoppel
(section 315(e)(2)), specifically over district court and ITC
proceedings. These provisions attach at "final written decision" and
prevent the petitioner from raising any ground the petitioner "raised
or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review."12
While what a petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised"
continues to be litigated, practitioners generally bring unpatentability
challenges based on the best available known art, fearing that the
estoppel provision will bar any opportunity to bring additional
invalidity challenges, before the PTAB1 2 6 or elsewhere.2 1
The AIA precludes anyone who has filed for declaratory judgment
on invalidity or been served with a complaint of infringement more than
a year prior from requesting an IPR.1 This provision, coupled with the
PTO's discretion to stay, transfer, consolidate, or terminate additional
concurrent proceedings before the PTO, complicates disputes.129
Similarly, the statute precludes CBM petitioners from reasserting
invalidity grounds they "raised or reasonably could have raised" in
future PTO proceedings.' But unlike IPR or PGR proceedings,
following the issuance of a final written decision, the petitioner is
only prevented from raising invalidity positions that were actually
"raised during that [CBM] proceeding" in district-court or ITC
125. § 315(e), 125 Stat. at 300-02. But see id. § 316(a) (11) (making an exception
to the one-year deadline for IPRs by a period for "not more than [six] months" for
"good cause shown," but the Director may "adjust the time periods in this paragraph in
the case of joinder under section 315(c)" (emphasis added)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ("An
inter partes review proceeding shall be administered such that pendency before the
Board after institution is normally no more than one year. The time can be
extended by up to six months for good cause by the Chief Administrative Patent
Judge, or adjusted by the Board in the case of joinder." (emphasis added)).
126. E.g., Dell, Inc. v. Elecs. & Telecomms. Res. Inst., No. IPR2015-00549, 2015
WL 1731182, at *4-5 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2015) (finding estoppel applied regardless of
whether U.S. patent prior art was raised in the earlier proceeding).
127. See, e.g., Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., No. 12-C-2533, slip op. at 18-19, 30
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) (granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and holding claims invalid that the Board had already determined to
be unpatentable).
128. § 315(a)(1), (b), 125 Stat. at300-01.
129. § 315(b), 125 Stat. at 301; 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a) ("Where another matter
involving the patent is before the Office, the Board may during the pendency of the inter
partes review enter any appropriate order regarding the additional matter including
providing for the stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter.").
130. § 325(e)(1), 125 Stat. at 307-08.
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proceedings."' The bar on declaratory judgment actions for
invalidity also applies to CBMs. 12
The estoppel described above applies by statute not only to the
actual petitioning party, but also to real-parties-in-interest and any
privies of the petitioning party. It is important to consider whom the
statute will estop from bringing invalidity challenges in the district
court after a PTAB proceeding concludes. Often, the willingness of
non-petitioning co-defendants in court litigation to agree to be
bound by a petitioning defendant's eventual estoppel increases the
likelihood of a district court granting the stay.133
C. Federal CircuitJudges Can Sit by Designation and Preside over Patent
Cases in the Eastern District of Texas
U.S. Code title 28, section 291 provides the statutory authority for
Article III circuit judges to sit by designation in another circuit or
district court."' It names the ChiefJudge of the U.S. Supreme Court
as the ultimate gatekeeper.'5 The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court has the ultimate authority to designate a circuit judge to sit,
temporarily, as a district judge in a U.S. district court.s' The Chief
Justice may also designate any circuitjudge to sit in another circuit.13 1
However, section 291 does not spell out how the decision to
designate a judge comes before the Chief Justice.'13 Instead, formal
procedures are set forth in The Use of Visiting judges in the Federal
131. § 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. at329-30.
132. § 18(a) (1) (B), 125 Stat. at 329-30.
133. See, e.g., AIP Acquisition LLC v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, No. 12-617-GMS,
slip op. at 5 (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2014) (granting a stay where defendants agreed to
limited estoppel); e-Watch Inc. v. Avigilon Corp., No. H-13-0347, 2013 WL 6633936,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013) (ordering continuation of a stay if the defendant
agreed to estoppel); eWatch, Inc. v. Lorex Can., Inc., No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL
5425298, at *1, *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013) (granting a stay where the defendant
requested limited estoppel in the alternative); Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC v.
Bear Creek Techs., Inc., No. 12-md-2344 (GMS), 2013 WL 3789471, at *2, *4 (D. Del.
July 17, 2013) (granting a stay where non-moving defendants agreed to estoppel).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 291 (2012).
135. Id. § 291(a).
136. Id. § 291(b) ("The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, in the
public interest, designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge within the circuit,
including a judge designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold a
district court in any district within the circuit.").
137. Id. § 291 (a) ("The Chief Justice of the United States may, in the public
interest, designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in
another circuit upon request by the chiefjudge or circuitjustice of such circuit.").
138. See id. § 291.
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District Courts: A Guide for Judges & Court Personnel, a guide published
by the Federal Judicial Center."' Judges may also seek to sit by
designation informally.'o
The guide is the result of efforts by a working group authorized by
former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in 1998. "' The goal of
the working group "was to consider whether there were actions the
judicial branch could take to alleviate the pressures arising from an
increasing caseload and a lack of new judgeships," with the working
group's efforts focused "on the needs of the district courts."l42 The
Federal Judicial Center published the Guide in light of the working
group's recommendations that, among other things, efforts be made
to " [e]ndorse creative ways of using visiting judges to maximize the
judges' value to the borrowing courts and minimize administrative
burdens for both the visitors and the courts receiving assistance," and
"[e]nhance [a] circuit-based system[] for providing district courts
with visiting judge assistance.""' The purpose of the Guide is "to
help borrowing courts and visiting judges work together in an
effective, efficient, and mutually beneficial way," and "offer []
suggestions based on the advice and experiences of courts that have
used the services of visiting judges.""'
The formal process by which a circuit judge sits in a district court
in another circuit begins when a circuit judge interested in sitting
outside the judge's home circuit expresses interest to the chief judge
of that circuit.14 5 Judges are encouraged to discuss why, where, and
when she or he wishes to serve, as well as any special policies of the
home circuit."' With the chief judge of the circuit's approval, the
interested judge (or the chief judge) then submits registration
paperwork to the Judicial Conference Committee on Intercircuit
139. NIcHOLLE STAHL-REISDORFF, THE USE OF VISITINGJUDGES IN THE FEDERAL DiSTRICr
COURTS: A GUIDE FORJUDGES & COURT PERSONNEL, at v, 1-5 (2001, rev. 2006).
140. See generally Richard George Kopf, Have Robe, Will Travel, HERCULES & THE
UMPIRE (July 28, 2013), http://wednesdaywiththedecentlyprofane.me/2013/07/28/
have-robe-will-travel (describing, anecdotally, his experience as a senior judge sitting
by designation). Notably, there are differences between the process by which a
senior judge sits by designation and the process by which active judges sit by
designation. Compare STAHL-REISDORFF, supra note 139, at 30, with id. at 32
(explaining both processes).
141. See STAHL-REISDORFF, supra note 139, at vii.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at viii.
145. Id. at 30.
146. Id.
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Assignments (JCCLA), which, in turn, places the interested judge on a
roster of judges available to sit by designation. 147 Upon the request
by the chief judge of the district court in which the circuit judge was
interested in serving, the JCCIA may then match the requests.'
With the approval of the Chief Justice,'49 and consistent with the
borrower/lender rule,1"o the circuit judge is assigned to sit by
designation in the requesting district court.151
There may be particularly compelling reasons for Federal Circuit
judges to sit by designation in the Eastern District of Texas. One
study found that district court judges cut their likelihood of reversal
by half with respect to appeals before the Federal Circuit after the
147. Id. at 31; see Kopf, supra note 140.
148. See Kopf, supra note 140 ("That committee takes requests from courts for
help, and then seeks senior judges willing to help. The committee matches senior
judges with district courts that need help.").
149. See, e.g., STAHL-REISDORFF, supra note 139, at 2.
150.
Intercircuit assignments must conform to the "lender/borrower rule," a
nonstatutory rule, which the Chief Justice approved in its original form in
1997. The rule was revised in 2004. Generally, a circuit that lends active
judges may not borrow from another circuit within the same time period of
the assignment; a circuit that borrows active judges may not lend within the
same time period of the assignment. The lender/borrower rule does not
apply to senior judges or to judges assigned to a particular case. The rule
may be relaxed in appropriate situations, provided the chief judge of the
lending circuit or court is consulted to ensure that the needs of that circuit
or court are met first. The lender/borrower rule does not apply when an
active judge is borrowed or lent for a particular case or cases after the
disqualification of all judges in the borrowing circuit or in other emergency
situations. In the event that all judges of a given circuit disqualify
themselves, the chief judge must notify the chair of the Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments who, in consultation with the Chief Justice, will
select a judge or panel of judges as needed. To avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest, judges of the borrowing circuit, once
recused, may not participate in the selection of the visiting judge orjudges.
Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
151. Judges may also make arrangements informally, within the limitations of
§ 291. Judge Kopf described his experience sitting by designation outside his circuit
as follows: "I worked with the clerk from that district on a national advisory
committee dealing with pro se law clerks. From that committee work, I learned that
the New York district needed help with habeas cases and I offered to take some of
those cases. The clerk contacted his chief judge and then worked with the circuit
executive of his circuit and staff in Washington to secure the intercircuit
assignment." Kopf, supra note 140.
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district court judge sat by designation in the Federal Circuit.152 The
authors concluded that the results were likely "driven by the personal
connections the judges make with the appellate court, not by any
learning effect." 5 1 Thus, it may be that if more Federal Circuit judges
were to sit by designation in the Eastern District of Texas, the reversal
rate of appeals from the Eastern District of Texas to the Federal Circuit
would decrease-potentially because of the personal connections forged
between the judges from the two courts in the process.
Further, sitting by designation has the advantage of exposing
judges to certain interlocutory issues of law that may not present
themselves on appeal for some time-if ever. Likewise, sitting by
designation can be used informally as a means of expressing an
interest in the direction of certain aspects of district court case law, or
as a corrective for the same, although circuit judges must be mindful
of the delicate relationship between the largely autonomous district
court decision makers and the appellate judiciary. Notably, Judge
Bryson has again recently sat by designation in the Eastern District of
Texas on a major issue: transfer of venue and the continuing validity
of the holding in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. "' And
Judge Bryson issued a lengthy, well-researched opinion (sitting by
designation in the Eastern District of Texas) guiding district courts
on how to apply a summary judgment motion for section 101 patent
subject matter eligibility. 55
Notably, Judge Bryson clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall, spent time at the Justice Department, was
appointed to the Federal Circuit by President Clinton in 1994, and
took senior status in 2013; a Houston native, he now maintains a full
docket of Eastern District of Texas cases and is serving a seven-year
term as a judge on the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review."5 He has been repeatedly authorized by the Chief Justice
152. Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em? How Sitting
by Designation Affects judicial Behavior 10-11 (Stanford Pub. L. Working Paper No.
2449349, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2449349.
153. Id. at 34.
154. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see Script Security Solutions, LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 1055827, at *1-5 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
17, 2016) (Bryson,I., sitting by designation).
155. See Preservation Wellness Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,
No. 2:15-cv-01559-WCB (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2016). Further discussions of these kinds
of cases is beyond the scope of this Essay, and merit future discussion.
156. See William C. Bryson, Circuit Judge, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/william-c-bryson-circuitjudge
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of the United States under section 295 to preside over a docket of
cases in the Eastern District. 1-
II. NEC TECHNOLOGY V. HTC
A. Dispute History
In 2013, France Brevets, a French patent assertion entity (PAE),
sought to monetize against international device manufacturers
through a U.S. counterpart, NFC Technology LLC. France Brevets
sought licenses for value, as evidenced by the company's eventually
securing licenses from LG, among others.'" The dispute between
HTC and France Brevets/NFC is self-admittedly international and
wide-ranging, though a broader discussion of the dispute is beyond
the scope of this Essay.
Of relevance here, in late 2013, NFC Technology filed a patent
infringement complaint against HTC America, Inc. and other
defendants.5"' It accused HTC of infringing two patents, U.S. Patent
No. 6,700,551 ("the '551 patent") and U.S. Patent No. 7,665,664
("the '664 patent"). 16o
Some seven months later, HTC petitioned the PTO's PTAB,
requesting that it conduct two inter partes reviews, one each on the
asserted claims of the '551 and the '664 patent.16 ' Thereafter, NFC
added additional asserted claims of the latter '664 patent (claims
fourteen, fifteen, and nineteen), that were not within the scope of
those petitions.16 HTC filed a third petition on those remaining
claims in December 2014. 16
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016); see also Charlie Savage, Newest Spy Court Pick is a Democrat but
Not a Liberal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/us/
roberts-varies-pattern-in-choice-for-spy-court.html.
157. See, e.g.,Judge William Bryson Designated to Peform judicial Duties in the Eastern
District of Tezas, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/announcements/judge-william-bryson-designated-
perform-judicial-duties-eastern-district-texas-0 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
158. France Brevets, Licenses NFC Patents to LG Electronics as its First Licensee,
www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FBsignsLGE-release_18thAugust.pdf.
159. NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111,
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In February 2015, the Board granted the first two petitions for
review.'" With the third still pending, HTC filed a motion to stay the
pending litigation. 65
B. IPR-Related Stay Standards
Judge Bryson began by citing the three-prong test discussed at
length above1": (1) whether a stay will simplify issues at trial, (2)
whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set, and (3) whether
a stay will unduly prejudice the non-moving party.16 7 The opinion
presents the test as balancing the simplification of the issues, the state
of the proceedings, and any undue prejudice.'"
In laying out the three-prong test, Judge Bryson first cited four
cases: two IPR cases, one from the Eastern District of Texas'" and
the other from Delaware,'70 and two earlier, oft-cited persuasive cases
from the Eastern District of Texas related to motions to stay in light
of reexaminations.7 1
Importantly, Judge Bryson noted, "Those three factors largely
overlap with the four factors that Congress has expressly set forth as
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
167. NEC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *2; see, e.g., Lennon Image Techs., LLC
v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., Nos. 2:13-cv-00235-JRG, 2:13-cv-00239-JRG, 2014 WL
4652117, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2014) (denying the defendant's motion to
stay); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1029-30 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC,
No. SACV 12-01861 JGB (MLGx), 2013 WL 1716068, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013)
(applying the reexamination inquiry to considerations of a stay pending IPR);
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST
(JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *1 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (denying the
defendant's motion to stay); see also Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 10-389-LPS, 2012
WL 3061027, at *2 (D. Del. July 26, 2012) (denying the defendants' motion to stay);
Gryphon Networks Corp. v. Contact Ctr. Compliance Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90
(D. Mass 2011) (granting the defendant's motion to stay); Soverain Software LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (denying the
defendants' motion to stay).
168. NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *2-4.
169. Lennon Image Techs., LLC, 2014 WL 4652117, at *2.
170. Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin. LP, 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D.
Del. 2013).
171. NEC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *2 (citing Soverain Software LLC, 356 F.
Supp. 2d at 662; EchoStar Techs. Corp. v. TiVo, Inc., No. 5:05-cv-81, 2006 WL
2501494, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2006)).
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governing the question [of] whether a stay should be granted
pending [CBM] review proceedings before the PTAB."7 2
For CBMs, section 18 of the AIA mandates the overlapping four-
factor test, adding a fourth element173 :
(A) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues in
question and streamline the trial;
(B) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has
been set;
(C) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly prejudice
the nonmoving party or present a clear tactical advantage for the
moving party; and
(D) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of
litigation on the parties and on the court. 174
To be sure, one is statutory and the other judge-made, but he clarifies:
It is true that the stay provisions for CBM review are statutory, while
the stay practice for inter partes has been developed by the
courts. However, the standards for granting stay relief are
generally similar....
The overlap between the standards for granting a stay in those
two contexts is not surprising, since both CBM review and inter
partes review, like reexamination, are designed to promote the
same policy goals.7 5
Thus, he noted, "In light of the parallel policies underlying the
CBM and inter partes review proceedings, it is not surprising that
courts have applied a generally similar analysis to requests for stays in
both settings."171
To wit, the additional fourth factor for CBMs indicates Congress's
desire that the courts pay special attention to minimizing the burden
of litigation involving patents relating to business and financial
methods.'7 7 Judge Bryson took pains to note that, while the factor
has been used to distinguish IPR and CBM stays, in cases such as
172. NFC Tech. LLC, 2015WL 1069111, at *2.
173. See Progressive Cas. Ins. v. Safeco Ins. of Ill., No. 1:10CV01370, 2013 WL
1662952, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2013).
174 AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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Progressive Casualy Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois,'7" other
courts considering IPR stays have looked to that factor as well. 79
C. The Three Factors
1. Undue prejudice
First, Judge Bryson noted that other Eastern District of Texas stay
cases recognize that there is a delay inherent in any IPR-related stay
that cannot be discounted and is entitled to some weight."so But he
found that the inherent delay present in every case cannot itself be
sufficient to defeat a stay motion, citing three other stay decisions
from other jurisdictions."s8
Turning to the merits, he found that NFC Technology made
generalized claims of prejudice related to the stay, quoting them as
stating that "memories will fade and discovery may likely be lost."
182
He dismissed this unsupported, generalized claim as inherent to, and
generic of, any IPR stay challenge.'3 He noted that NFC Technology
sought only monetary compensation (i.e., it did not seek an
injunction), and thus found no time sensitivity that would put
pressure on this factor. 184
178. No. 1:10CV01370, 2013 WL 1662952 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2013); see id. at *2.
179. NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *2 (citing Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v.
Bloomberg Fin. LP, 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D. Del. 2013); Ultratec, Inc. v.
Sorenson Commc'ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, 2013 WL 6044407, at *2-3 (W.D. Wis.
Nov. 14, 2013)).
180. Id. (citing Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc., No. 6:11-
cv-492, 2015 BL 70301, at *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015) (granting a motion to lift a
stay); Lennon Image Techs., LLC v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00235,
2014 WL 4652117, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2014) (denying motion for stay);
ThinkOptics, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-455, 2014 WL 4477400, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2014) (same); Unifi Scientific Batteries, LLC v. Sony Mobile
Commc'ns AB, No. 6:12cv224, 2014 WL 4494479, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014)
(same); Voltstar Techs., Inc. v. Superior Commc'ns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00082-JRG,
2013 WL 4511290, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013) (same).
181. Id. (citing E-Watch, Inc. v. Lorex Can., Inc., No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL
5425298, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013) (granting defendant's motion for stay);
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-
JST(JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (same); TierraVision,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 11CV2170 DMS(BGS), 2012 WL 559993, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 21, 2012) (same).
182. Id. at *3.
183. Id.
184. See id. (concluding that simply stating evidence that may become stale or lost
is not compelling in showing prejudice).
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NFC Technology also argued that HTC came to the proceeding
with unclean hands because of "dilatory behavior," consisting chiefly
of filing a motion to transfer venue." Judge Bryson dismissed this
out of hand, finding no evidence of unusually dilatory action."' He
concluded that "the prejudice factor cuts slightly against a stay, but no
more than would typically be the case when a plaintiff is faced with the
prospect of a delay in obtaining monetary relief on its claims.""
2. State of the proceedings
Judge Bryson noted that the litigation was over a year old and that
"[b]y the time the motion to stay was filed," "claim construction
briefing was complete" and both "parties had engaged in significant
discovery."'" He also noted that discovery was ongoing and not set to
complete for another month. Finally, he concluded that while the
case was not "in its infancy" and a "stay would interfere with
proceedings," it did look like the majority of expenses to be incurred
were still to come,' acknowledging that it was very possible the
parallel proceedings would simplify or obviate the issues at trial,
greatly reducing the litigation costs to both parties.9 o Although he
did not explicitly state that the IPR could lead to settlement, his
discussion of the possible obviation of the need for a trial implies that
he, like other judges, is aware that IPRs have served as a vehicle for
settlement in many pending disputes, and that a significant portion
of all IPR disputes themselves settle before concluding.'
He noted that another factor is the diligence with which the IPR
petitioner/defendant pursued parallel relief. Here, he found that
"[t]he petitions for inter partes review were filed seven and one-half
months after the action was brought, and four months after NFCT
filed its infringement contentions. The motion for a stay was filed
very promptly after the PTAB instituted the inter partes review.""'
He held that seven and one half months from the filing of a
complaint, and four months after contentions have been served, was







191. See id. (predicting that "significant expenses ... might be avoided if the stay
results in the simplification (or obviation) of further court proceedings").
192. Id.
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seeking inter partes review.""'s He cited to a number of cases
establishing that an IPR filed four months after infringement
contentions or identification of asserted claims was reasonable.194
3. Simplification of the issues
Here, Judge Bryson led by stating, "In the [c] ourt's view, the most
important factor bearing on whether to grant a stay in this case is the
prospect that the inter partes review proceeding will result in
simplification of the issues before the [c] ourt." "' He noted that IPRs
were designed by Congress specifically to simplify issues of invalidity
by relying on the agency's expert ability and focus.'96
He cited to an older, influential case concerning the merits of
staying in light of reexamination, indicating they were equally (if not
more) relevant here:
1. All prior art presented to the [c]ourt will have been first
considered by the PTO, with its particular expertise.
2. Many discovery problems relating to prior art can be alleviated
by the PTO examination.
3. In those cases resulting in effective invalidity of the patent, the
suit will likely be dismissed.
4. The outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement
without the further use of the [c]ourt.
5. The record of reexamination would likely be entered at trial,
thereby reducing the complexity and length of the litigation.
6. Issues, defenses, and evidence will be more easily limited in pre-
trial conferences after a reexamination.
7. The cost will likely be reduced both for the parties and the
[c] ourt. 197
He noted that here, the likelihood of beneficial simplification was
high, with two patents, most claims, and estoppel likely to attach to
193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. (citing Destination Maternity Corp. v. Target Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 762,
766-68 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (less than four months held reasonably timely); Software
Rights Archive, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. C-12-3970 RMW, 2013 WL 5225522, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013) (just over four months held reasonably timely);
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST
(JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (three- to four-month
delay held reasonably timely)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Fisher Controls Co. v. Control Components, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 581,
582 (S.D. Iowa 1977), quoted with approval in Premier Int'l Assocs. LLC v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 554 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (E.D. Tex. 2008)).
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the defendant-petitioner.1 18  He also noted (as many others have)
that the potential for simplification is "far more speculative before
the PTAB decides whether to institute inter partes review," as there is
no guarantee of institution,99 and current data shows a likelihood of
denial in a significant percentage of cases.200 He cited to a line of
cases related to CBM and IPR decisions, and noted that the institution
of an IPR is thus a significant factor in favor of granting a stay.201 He
reiterated that case's holding that it was "not error for the district
court to wait until the PTAB made its decision to institute CBM
review before it ruled on the motion" to stay.202
While NFC Technology tried to argue that VirtualAgility, a CBM
case, applied to CBM review and not IPR review and thus was
inapposite here, Judge Bryson disagreed, analyzing the case and
stating that "the standards for granting stay relief are generally
similar," and "the additional statutory factor applied in the CBM
review context-whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on
the parties and the court-is a consideration that courts often taken
[sic] into account in determining whether to grant a stay pending
inter partes review." 20s He found that the two are meant to promote
the same policy goals and agreed with NFC Technology that CBM
stays represent a clear directive toward making "stay relief readily
available in CBM review cases."204
He went on to say that;
Congress's desire to enhance the role of the PTO and limit the
burden of litigation on courts and parties was not limited to the
CBM review context. The legislative history indicates that Congress
recognized that the same underlying policy considerations that
apply to CBM review apply to inter partes review as well. 205
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics,
at 7 (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-
29%20PTAB.pdf.
201. NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *4.
202. Id. at *5 (citing VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011), reprinted in 2011
U.S.C.C.A.N.N. 67, 78; 157 CONG. REc. 12,984 (2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(arguing that post-grant review of patents, including IPR, was meant to be "an
inexpensive substitute for district court litigation" that "allows key issues to be
addressed by experts in the field"); 157 CONG. REc. 2710 (statement of Sen. Grassley)
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Then he cited dozens of district court cases, noting that "courts
have been nearly uniform in granting motions to stay proceedings in
the trial court after the PTAB has instituted IPR proceedings."2 06
He acknowledged that the few cases departing from that nearly
uniform trend had unusual facts.2 0 7 He noted a similar trend for
(reporting that IPR was intended to provide a "faster, less costly alternative[] to civil
litigation to challenge patents").
206. Id. at *6 (citing Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C-14-3348
EMC, 2015 WL 1006582, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015); Gentherm Can., Ltd. v. IGB
Auto., Ltd., No. 13-11536, 2015 WL 804657, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2015);
Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-5501-SI, 2015 WL 435457,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015); Serv. Solutions US, LLC v. Autel.US Inc., No. 13-
10534, 2015 WL 401009, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2015); In re CTP Innovations,
LLC, No. 14-MD-2581, 2015 WL 317149, at *2-3 (D. Md. Jan. 23, 2015); Safe Storage
LLC v. Dell Inc., No. 12-1624-GMS, slip op. at 5 (D. Del. Jan. 22, 2015); Cutsforth,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Techs. Corp., Civ. No. 12-1200(SRN/JSM) (D. Minn.
Jan. 15, 2015); CANVS Corp. v. United States, No. 10-540C, 2014 BL 378446, at *1
(Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 2014); Kaneka Corp. v. SKC Kolon PI, Inc., CV 11-3397 JGB(RZx),
2014 BL 378445, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014); Locata LBS LLC v. Paypal Inc., No. C
14-01864, 2014 BL 378444, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014); Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 2:12-cv-333-JDL, 2014 WL 6388489, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 14, 2014); Norman
IP Holdings, LLC v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 6:13-cv-278-JDL, slip op. at 1 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 8, 2014); Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI Tech., Inc., No. 13-cv-02013-
JST, 2014 WL 5021100, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v.
Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02454-WSD, 2014 WL 5019911, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 7, 2014); Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 1:13-cv-
04513, 2014 WL 4802426, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014); PersonalWeb Techs., LLC
v. Google Inc., No. 5:13-cv-01317-EJD, 2014 WL 4100743, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2014); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 13-2071 (ADM/JSM), 2014
WL 5369386, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2014); Affinity Labs of Texas LLC v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV-2717 YGR, 2014 WL 3845684, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014);
Depomed Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 13-571 (JAP), 2014 WL 3729349, at *1
(D.N.J.July 25, 2014)).
207. Id. at *6 n.1 ("For example, in Drone Technologies, Inc. v. Parrot S.A., No.
14cv111, 2014 WL 6607484[, at *4] (W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2014), the court noted that
the defendants had been guilty of 'flagrant failure to permit this case to proceed
through discovery' and had entered a default judgment against the defendants on
the merits. Under those circumstances, the court saw no reason to further delay the
proceedings before it. In SCVNGR, Inc. v. eCharge Licensing, LLC, No. 13-12418-DJC,
2014 WL 4804738[, at *9-10] (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2014), Intellectual Ventures IIL.L.C.
v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13 Civ. 3777[, 2014 WL 10919562, at *4] (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 11, 2014), and Invensys Systems, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co., No. 6:12-CV-00799,
2014 WL 4477393[, at *3-4] (E.D. Tex. July 27, 2014), the courts denied stays
because the PTAB had granted review of only some of the asserted claims or patents,
and the courts were not persuaded that the PTAB review proceedings were likely to
result in significant simplification of the issues in suit.").
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CBMs.2 0s Unequivocally, he found that "after the PTAB has instituted
review proceedings, the parallel district court litigation ordinarily
should be stayed." 2 09
Finally, he found that there were no facts here that compelled the
court to depart from that general rule.210 Despite the fact that some
claims had not yet had an institution decision, he noted that those
claims were added later and that the defendants promptly filed
another IPR (at their expense) to cover the newly asserted claims."
D. Lessons Learned
1. A stay motion is generally not ripe until the PTAB proceeding has been
instituted, and prejudice is viewed at the time offiling the motion
As noted by Judge Bryson, many courts have been willing to call
motions to stay premature unless the PTAB proceeding has been
212 the13instituted, especially the Eastern District of Texas.1  Judge Bryson
held that the "likelihood [of simplifying the issues] is far more
speculative before the PTAB decides whether to institute [IPR]."2"
This counsels for diligence and speed in preparing and filing IPR
proceedings. The earlier a stay motion can be filed, the earlier a
motion can be ruled upon, and the less prejudice will accrue.211
However, Judge Bryson's recognition of the key fact in these cases,
the institution decision, counsels for the earliest possible filing of any
208. Id. at *6 (citing Moneycat Ltd. v. Paypal Inc., No. 14-cv-02490-JST, 2014 WL
5689844, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014); Secure Axcess, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
No. 6:13-cv-717, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2014); DataTreasury Corp. v.
Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-431-JRG-RSP, slip op. at 15 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014);
Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., No. 13-cv-2637 (SRN/SER), slip op. at 1 (D. Minn.
Sept. 18, 2014); Segin Sys., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 2:13cv190, 2014 WL
3895931, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2014)).
209. Id. at *7.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at *4-5; see, e.g., Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15cv21,
2015 WL 2454296, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2015) (deferring ruling on a motion to
stay until the PTO makes an IPR decision).
213. See NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *4--5; Promethean Insulation Tech.
LLC v. Sealed Air Corp., No. 2:13-CV-1113-JRG-RSP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182879, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2014).
214. NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *4.
215. See id. (suggesting that if the stay motion had been filed "several months
earlier," it might have been granted because expenses of discovery and claim
construction proceeding could have been minimized).
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IPR challenge, preferably within the one-year bar, should further
challenges need to be filed.16
As a best practice, follow Judge Bryson's rule-of-thumb: aim to file
IPRs within seven and one half months of being sued and within
three to four months following infringement contentions, and this
factor should almost certainly lean in favor of granting a stay. That
being said, the earlier the filing, the more likely the grant of a stay
will be; later ones risk that courts and judges may find that the delay
was unreasonable, or at least cuts against granting a stay.
Currently, certain courts often deny stay motions prior to the
institution of review proceedings, but grant the defendants leave to
refile.' It is an open question as to whether the courts will consider
any prejudice fixed at the time of the filing of the first motion, or
fixed at the time of refiling. However, any early filing that is denied
without prejudice only logically increases the chances that the court
will either consider the prejudice as of the earlier date or, at worst,
consider it as of the date it would have otherwise been filed. Thus, it
may make sense to file an IPR motion to stay immediately after filing for
IPR, while acknowledging that you will seek to refile should the court
deny the motion as premature. Both clients and counsel should, of
course, consider minimizing legal costs when making such decisions.
2. If possible, file on all patents and all claims that have been asserted to
date and act quickly tofile on newly added claims
This rule may go without saying, but where possible, it is important
to file IPR petitions against all patents being asserted and all claims at
issue in the litigation if you are planning to seek a stay. This may not
always be possible, something both PTAB and district court judges
are aware of, but if reasonably made aware of a new set of asserted
claims, it might help to respond with diligence and additional filings.
3. A plaintiffs status as a direct competitor or a plaintiff actively seeking an
injunction may weigh against granting a stay
In NFC Technology LLC and many other cases, the plaintiff was
interested only in monetary relief, thus reducing the chance of any
prejudice, even in competitor-to-competitor suits." Indeed, in
VirtualAgility v. Salesforce, the Federal Circuit carefully analyzed the
evidence of whether the parties were direct competitors when
216. See id. at *4, *7.
217. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
218. E.g., NFC Tech. LLC, 2015 WL 1069111, at *3.
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evaluating the prejudice prong.219 In cases where the plaintiff is
actively seeking an injunction, however, the argument that a delay
will not prejudice them is a harder sell. Thus, evidence of
competition in the marketplace, as well as an early effort to secure
injunctive relief, may cut against granting a stay, and those
confronted with such cases must carefully consider whether the other
factors outweigh the presence of such facts.
CONCLUSION
If I go there will be trouble[,]
An' if I stay it will be double.
- The Clash2 o
He who seeks equity must do equity."' Those seeking or opposing
stays should come to the court with clean hands, make honest
arguments grounded in the weight of authority rather than anecdotal
exceptions, and live up to their responsibilities should a stay be
imposed, denied, or lifted. Judge Bryson's opinion has made seeking
a stay of district court litigation in light of an IPR or a CBM more
predictable, which lowers wasteful attorney fees and conserves
judicial resources. Granted or denied, an opinion carefully tracking
his guidance is more likely to be upheld on appeal than one flying in
the face of it. It is a roadmap for parties, counsel, and judges that can
faithfully guide them when confronted with a request for a stay.
This recognizes that the drafters of the AIA's section 18 envisioned
a process for CBMs that would lead quickly to Federal Circuit
precedent. By creating an interlocutory appeal from district court
action directly to the Federal Circuit, allowing for a de novo review
and grafting the three factors related to all stays onto the test to be
analyzed, the drafters paved an avenue to a fast-growing body of
precedent on what should merit a stay.
219. VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
220. THE CLASH, SHOULD I STAYOR SHOULD I Go (Epic Records 1982).
221. See, e.g., Mfrs.' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449 (1935) ("The maxim 'he
who seeks equity must do equity' presupposes that equitable, as distinguished from
legal, rights, substantive or remedial, have arisen from the subject matter in favor of
each of the parties; and it requires that such rights shall not be enforced in favor of
one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement except upon condition that he
consent to accord to the other his correlative equitable rights.").
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Judge Bryson has recognized and extended that wisdom with NFC
Technology LLC, showing others an avenue of speaking directly and
immediately to the district courts in a way so persuasive as to invite
accord, regardless of preconceived notions. Eschewing rhetoric for
exhaustive and meticulous research, support, and fact, he has
provided a roadmap to future judges and offers one salve in the face
of district-dependent decision making and inconsistent decisions that
might otherwise linger for years. We would all be wise to take note.
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